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I. INTRODUCTION
Included among the statutes of each state are laws that regulate the
size and weight of vehicles traveling upon public highways. Such regu-
lations represent a valid exercise of a state's police power to act in the
interest of public health and safety.1 Although most of these statutory
schemes apply uniformly, several differentiate and discriminate accord-
ing to the class of carrier operated, the nature of the business involved,
or the type of commodity carried.2 These statutes exempt specified car-
1. See Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388 (1932); see also Gutridge v. Virginia, 532 F.
Supp. 533, 539 n.4 (E.D. Va. 1982) ("Vehicle weight limits are an essential part of a highway
safety program, because the amount of damage to the roads and danger to the traveling public
rises as the weights of vehicles increase.") (citing Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783
(1945); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 194-95 (1938)).
2. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 32-9-23 (1983) (exempting vehicles hauling refrigerated milk for
human consumption from weight restriction); CAL. VEI. CODE § 35552 (West Supp. 1984) (al-
lowing higher weight limitation to vehicles loaded solely with logs); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-
26(g)(1) (Supp. 1984) (allowing higher weight limitation to vehicles hauling the following products
within the same county or adjoining counties: forest products from the place of cutting to the
owner's place of business, plant, plantation, or residence; live poultry from a farm to a processing
plant; feed from a mill to a farm; granite from a quarry to a processing plant); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
95 , § 15-101(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1984) (exempting from weight restrictions implements of
husbandry hauling fresh, perishable fruits or vegetables from farm to point of first processing);
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 1655 (Supp. 1983) (allowing higher weight limitation to vehicles
loaded entirely with firewood, sawed lumber, dimension lumber, pulpwood, wood chips, logs,
soils, unconsolidated rock materials, bolts, farm produce, manufacturer's concrete products, build-
ing materials which absorb moisture during delivery within the state, and raw ore, vehicles loaded
with a majority of refrigerated products, and vehicles of the following types: dump trucks, tractor
dump trucks, and transit mix concrete trucks carrying highway construction materials); MD.
TRANsP. CODE ANN. § 24-111.1 (1984) (allowing higher weight limitation to vehicles carrying
liquid milk in bulk from the producer and excusing one violation per year by drivers carrying
perishable products exclusively); S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-4020 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1983) (exempt-
ing from weight limitations vehicles carrying implements and products of husbandry, including
vehicles used to transport, store, or spread soil improvement products for agricultural purposes);
VA. CODE §§ 46.1-343, 343.1 (Supp. 1984) (exempting from weight restriction any vehicle carrying
containerized cargo in a sealed, seagoing container bound to or from a Virginia seaport, special
vehicles used in hauling coal, three-axle vehicles used exclusively for mixing concrete in transit or
at a project site or for transporting necessary components to produce concrete upon immediate
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riers from meeting the limits to which others must conform and create
what appear to be inequities. Trucking companies and businesses that
are identical to exempted haulers in every way except for the statutory
basis for distinction must comply with more stringent regulations or
face prosecution for failing to do so. Questions of equal protection that
arise in the area of roadway regulation, however, receive only limited
judicial scrutiny.3 Courts are expected to, and often do, defer to legis-
lative judgment, conducting the relaxed examination for rationality
typical of substantive equal protection cases.4 Despite judicial passivity
in this area, some recourse may be available to those subject to this
form of economic discrimination.
This note will examine the split of authority among courts that
have grappled with these statutes in recent years. 5 It undertakes an
examination of equal protection doctrine in the area of public safety
and highway regulation in order to ascertain the scope of judicial re-
view that properly may be applied to highway weight restriction stat-
utes.6 The objective is to clarify the circumstances under which an
equal protection remedy may exist for parties upon whom an economic
burden falls.
II. PRINCIPLES OF EQUAL PROTECTION REVIEW: THE RATIONAL
BASIS STANDARD
The first step in equal protection review is to assess the nature of
the statute in question. The typical highway weight restriction statute
contains a series of maximum gross weight limits that are based upon
vehicle type and axle specifications. 7 These standards are generally de-
termined by the number of axles and the distance between groups of
axles; the greater the number, the distance, or both, the greater the per-
missible weight. This classification is based upon a recognition of the
important relationship between weight distribution and the statutory
aims of highway maintenance and safety. Contrast this classification,
arrival at a project site, and vehicles hauling farm produce on the state's Eastern Shore). That the
carriers of such an assortment of products are accorded preferential statutory treatment suggests
that more is at work than the protection of state roadways and the public health and safety. More
likely, the aim is to provide an economic advantage to the industries selected.
3. See, e.g., Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 388-89 (1932).
4. See, eg., Gutridge v. Virginia, 532 F. Supp. 533, 537 (E.D. Va. 1982). Particularly where
the police power of a state is involved, courts refuse to inquire into the substantive wisdom of or
motive for a legislative enactment and will act with deference whenever a rational basis may
possibly be inferred. Id; see infra notes 39-52 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 18-52 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 53-94 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 483.506 (1983); VA. CODE § 46.1-339 (Supp. 1984).
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however, with one based upon the type of product that a vehicle car-
ries. Statutes incorporating such classifications allow carriers of poul-
try,8 lumber,9 milk,'0 coal," or other diverse products to exceed lawful
weight limits without penalty solely because of the nature of the cargo.
The relationship between this type of classification and the statutory
aim is less clear.
It is evident that highway weight restriction statutes and exemp-
tions result in economic discrimination. Courts presently review al-
leged instances of economic discrimination pursuant to a "rational
basis" test12 that grants state legislatures wide discretion in enacting
8. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-26(g)(1) (Supp. 1984).
9. See, e.g., CAL. VEH. CODE § 35552 (West Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. § 483.506 (1983).
10. See, eg., AI.A. CODE § 32-9-23 (1983); MD. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 24-111.1 (1984).
11. See, eg., VA. CODE § 46.1-343 (1983).
12. Allegations of economic discrimination have been scrutinized pursuant to the "rational
basis" test since the mid-1930's. At that time, the United States Supreme Court took a decisive
step toward establishing the judicial approach to equal protection in the economic realm that has
been followed in subsequent years. This modem test evolved as a reaction to the trend ofjudicial
activism that had characterized review of legislation during the 45 preceding years. That ap-
proach, which became known as "substantive due process" or "substantive equal protection,"
entailed an exacting scrutiny of the wisdom and substantive validity of statutes of all types. The
most widely recognized example of this substantive scrutiny in the economic realm is Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which lends its name to the era. The statute under challenge in
Lochner established maximum hours for bakery employees. Id at 46 n.l. The Court found the
state's interference with the right to buy and sell labor to be an unconstitutional exercise of the
police power and rejected the state's rationale that it had acted to protect the health of bakers. Id
at 57-58. The Court conducted its own evaluation of the merits of the legislation, exhibiting a lack
of deference to the legislative judgment. Seeid at 56-58. Utilizing this approach, the Court inval-
idated many economic regulations during the period, particularly where it suspected the existence
of a legislative motive other than protection of the public health and welfare, as in Lochner, id at
64. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 561-62 (1925) (invalidating a minimum
wage law for women); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1915) (invalidating a statute prohibiting
"yellow dog" contracts).
In the mid-1930's, however, the Court reformulated its position on judicial review of eco-
nomic regulations and began retreating from the activist decisions. Initial retrenchment from the
Lochner approach began in 1934 with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934), in which the
Court upheld a state law establishing minimum retail milk prices. The trend away from Lochner
continued with West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937), which expressly over-
ruled Adkins. In sharp contrast to the tenor of the Adkins opinion, the Court noted the prerogative
of the legislature to consider the situation of women in employment and adopt measures to reduce
the evils. Id at 399. The following year, in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144
(1938), the Court reiterated its new approach and gave an indication of the proper scope of judi-
cial scrutiny of statutes. Noting its respect for the legislative judgment reached after numerous
committee hearings, id at 148, the Court stated:
mhe existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, for regula-
tory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be pronounced un-
constitutional unless in light of the facts made known or generally assumed it is of such a
character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some rational basis within the
knowledge and experience of the legislators.
Id at 152. The Court then intimated that certain circumstances may call for stricter scrutiny:
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local regulations.13 The courts look for any rational relation between
the purpose for which the statute was enacted and the classification
made by the statute. 14 Operating under a presumption of constitution-
ality,15 any reasonably related state of facts known or that reasonably
could be assumed to have existed at the time of enactment will be
deemed to support the legislative judgment.' 6 This standard of mini-
There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitu-
tion, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally specific when
held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those political
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legisla-
tion, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny. . . than are most other types
of legislation . . . [such as that which imposes] restrictions upon the right to vote, ...
the dissemination of information, ... political organizations, [or] . . . peaceable
assembly.
Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes
directed at particular religious . . . or national . . . or racial minorities, . . . whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a more searching judicial inquiry.
Id at 152 n.4.
Since Carolene Products delineated this distinction between infringement of economic rights
and fundamental rights, confining the former to a nonrigorous review and reserving stricter scru-
tiny for the latter, judicial review of economic regulation consistently has been conducted accord-
ing to the presumption of constitutionality and deference to legislative judgment characteristic of
the "rational basis" test. See infra notes 13, 14; see also City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303 (1976) ("Unless a classification trammels fundamental personal rights or is drawn upon
inherently suspect distinctions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions presume the consti-
tutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only that the classification challenged be
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
13. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303-04 (1976) ("States are accorded
wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers. . . . [11n the
local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly arbitrary act, which
cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment."); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1954) ("The day is gone when this Court uses the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to strike down state laws, regulatory of business and industrial conditions,
because they may be unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of
thought.").
14. SeeRailway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) (regulation discrimi-
nating between trucks advertising their own business and those carrying advertisements of others
rationally related to statutory purpose of traffic safety).
15. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976).
16. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1930); see also Williamson v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1954) ("[T]he law need not be in every respect logically
consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correc-
tion, and that it might be thought that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to
correct it."). In Lee Optical, the Court upheld a state statute making it unlawful for any person not
a licensed optometrist or ophthalmologist to fit, duplicate, or replace lenses into frames without a
written prescription, effectively forbidding opticians from fitting or duplicating lenses without a
prescription. Id at 486. While noting that the statute at issue may often exact a "needless, waste-
ful requirement," id at 487, the Court nevertheless rendered a finding of rationality based upon
the possibility that the legislature may have concluded that the critical nature of eye examinations
and the frequency of occasions when a prescription was necessary justified the regulation. Id at
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mum rationality is recognized without exception as the appropriate
standard for review of legislation in the realms of public welfare and
the economy.' 7
III. APPLICATION IN HIGHWAY WEIGHT RESTRICTION CASES
Despite agreement as to the appropriate standard of equal protec-
tion review in cases challenging highway weight restriction exemptions,
the divergence of results demonstrates a lack of consistency in its appli-
cation. Courts considering very similar statutes under the same "ra-
tional basis" test have reached varying results as to their
constitutionality. Obviously, different interpretations exist as to the
proper scope of scrutiny required under the rational basis test as deline-
ated by the United States Supreme Court. The cases demonstrate the
divergence of results in relatively similar factual situations.
A. Cases Invalidating Exemptions Under the Rational Basis Test.
State v. Amyot' 8 involved the prosecution of truckers for violating
a highway weight restriction. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
considered and struck down a state statute that enabled truckers haul-
ing unprocessed forest products in the northern tier of the state to carry
loads that would otherwise violate the weight restriction.' 9 Each of the
defendants' vehicles was identical to the exempted vehicles except for
the commodity carried and the area of operation. 20 Noting that truck-
ers carrying unprocessed forest products-as opposed to the processed
products carried by the defendants-in the northern portion of the state
could carry identical poundage in identical vehicles and avoid prosecu-
tion, the court concluded that the statute made an arbitrary distinction
491. See also Kotch v. Board of River Port Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552, 563-64 (1946) (statute requir-
ing that all vessels sailing through the Mississippi River approaches to the port of New Orleans be
navigated by pilots who were state officers upheld, despite nepotism in the appointment process,
on basis of presumption that the legislature weighed the evils of a closely knit pilotage system
against the objectives of safety and efficiency). Both Lee Opticaland Kotch demonstrate the leni-
ency of the "rational basis" test.
17. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
18. 119 N.H. 671, 407 A.2d 812 (1979).
19. The court invalidated N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 263:64 VI (Supp. 1977) which provided
that a special annual permit allowing excess weight to be carried could be issued to a person
transporting unprocessed forest products on designated routes in specified areas of the state.
Amyot, 119 N.H. at 672, 407 A.2d at 813.
20. The vehicles themselves were identical and thus the defendants met the vehicle and axle
requirements for a permit. Id The defendants were violating the relevant restriction for vehicles
without a permit, but were within the limit allowed for vehicles with a permit. Had they been
carrying the commodity exempted by the statute in the area specified by the statute, they would
not have been subject to prosecution.
DUKE LAW JO URNAL
and denied equal protection to the nonexempt truckers. 21
The court noted that the guarantees of equal protection require a
rational relation between the purpose of a statute and the classification
that it makes. Finding no stated purpose, the court identified the im-
plicit purposes of the statute as protecting the highways from damage
caused by heavy loads, and promoting highway safety. The court held
that those aims could be inferred from any overweight truck statute. 22
The court found the classification made by the statute to be irra-
tional and arbitrary in relation to the purposes of highway maintenance
and public safety.3 It rejected the state's argument that because the
classification rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of
promoting the lumber industry in New Hampshire, it was not arbitrary
and thus did not violate principles of equal protection.24 Relying upon
the United States Supreme Court case of Smith v. Cahoon2s as well as a
recent Idaho case,26 the New Hampshire Supreme Court noted that al-
though furthering the interest of lumbermen may be a proper subject
for economic legislation, it bears no relation to public safety or high-
way maintenance.27 The court therefore concluded that favoring lum-
bermen by creating a classification within a public highway statute
violated equal protection guarantees. 28
The Idaho case of Sterling H Nelson & Sons v. Bender,29 on which
Amyot relied,30 involved a challenge to a state statute that exempted
haulers of unprocessed agricultural products from meeting certain
highway weight restrictions.31 The defendant being prosecuted for vio-
21. Id at 674, 407 A.2d at 814.
22. Id at 673, 407 A.2d at 813 (citing Sterling H. Nelson & Sons v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813,
815, 520 P.2d 860, 862 (1974)).
23. The court stated:
We cannot perceive how 90,000 pounds of unprocessed forest products is any less threat-
ening to highway safety or the upkeep of the public ways than 90,000 pounds of any
other commodity. Nor do we find any justifiable basis to treat truckers differently in the
northern part of the state than they are treated in the southern.
id
24. Id at 673, 407 A.2d at 813-14.
25. 283 U.S. 553 (1931). The Court in Cahoon invalidated a state statute that exempted card-
ers of agricultural, horticultural, dairy, and fish products from compliance with carrier certifica-
tion regulations. Id at 567; see infra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
26. Sterling H. Nelson & Sons v. Bender, 95 Idaho 813, 520 P.2d 860 (1974).
27. Amyot, 119 N.H. at 673, 407 A.2d at 814.
28. Id at 673-74, 407 A.2d at 814.
29. 95 Idaho 813, 520 P.2d 860 (1974).
30. Amyot, 119 N.H. at 673-74, 407 A.2d at 813-14.
31. IDAHO CODE § 49-901(c) (1967) exempted carriers of logs, pulpwood, poles or pilings,
ores, sand and gravel in bulk, and all unprocessed agricultural products, including livestock, from
the general weight restrictions, permitting them to carry heavier loads. Sterling H. Nelson & Sons
involved a challenge to the statutes exemption for carriers of unprocessed agricultural products
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lating the weight restriction was a hauler who would not have been in
violation had he been carrying an exempt commodity. As in Almyot,
the court looked to the legislative purpose to determine whether the
classification was irrational and arbitrarily discriminatory. In so doing
it applied a stricter standard than the New Hampshire Supreme Court
and more closely scrutinized the relationship between the purposes of
the statute and the exemption in order to ascertain whether all parties
similarly situated would be treated alike. 32
Looking to the nature of the challenged statute, the court found in
the weight restrictions a patent purpose of highway protection, sup-
ported in this instance by statutory language.33 Like the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court, the Idaho Supreme Court could not find the
requisite relation between the classification made and the purposes
sought to be accomplished by the statutory scheme.34 Thus, the court
and did not address the other exemptions provided by the statute. See 95 Idaho at 815, 520 P.2d at
862.
32. Rather than examining the statute for a "rational relation" between its purpose and the
classification that it makes, the court looked to whether the classification rested upon some differ-
ence having a "fair and substantial relation" to the object of the statute. Sterling H. Nelson & Sons,
95 Idaho at 815, 520 P.2d at 862. This rather unusual application of the intermediate tier of equal
protection scrutiny between the "rational relation" test generally applied to economic regulations
and other exercises of the state police power, see, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,
449 U.S. 456, 461 (1981); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1954), and the "strict
scrutiny" test generally applied to statutes involving a suspect class or a fundamental right, see,
e.g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) (racial classification presumptively
invalid); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (regarding the right to privacy), is most often
reserved for cases involving alleged sexual discrimination. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
197-98 (1976). The Idaho Supreme Court has since clarified its approach in Packard v. Joint
School Dist., 104 Idaho 604, 661 P.2d 770 (1983). Rather than recognizing the intermediate "sub-
stantial relation" test, or "means-focus" test as the court termed it, id at 607, 661 P.2d at 773, as a
separate standard of equal protection review, the court incorporated its approach into the rational
relation test, effectively merging the two. Thus, the rational relation test as interpreted by the
Idaho Supreme Court and applied to cases of economic discrimination, such as Sterling H. Nelson
& Sons, requires not only the existence of a rational relation between a statutory classification and
its ascribed purpose, but also that such relationship be fair and substantial. Packard 104 Idaho at
608, 661 P.2d at 774.
33. The language allowed for excess weight permits as may "be necessary to protect public
highways and bridges from injury" and allowed the Board of Highway Directors to make special
weight and speed regulations "as may be necessary for the protection of the road or for public
safety." Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, 95 Idaho at 815, 520 P.2d at 862.
34. Id The court was highly critical of the distinction between processed and unprocessed
agricultural products, stating that
[tihere is no evidence indicating that 20,000 pounds of processed agricultural commodi-
ties are any more detrimental to the state highway system than 20,000 pounds of un-
processed agricultural commodities, and common sense dictates otherwise. A statute
which permits a hauler to transport unprocessed grain to a factory at a weight of 18,900
pounds axle weight, but on the return trip with processed grain only permits a load of
18,000 pounds axle weight, bears no relation to the object of protecting the highways. In
the absence of some showing that a safety factor or other exigency requires such a dis-
tinction, as in State v. Pyle, 226 Or. 485, 360 P.2d 626 (1961), such a distinction is arbi-
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held that the statute violated the equal protection clause to the extent
that it exempted carriers of unprocessed agricultural commodities from
meeting the weight limitations.35
In holding these statutes unconstitutional, the courts in Amyot and
Sterling H. Nelson & Sons deferred in some measure to the legisla-
tures.3 6 Neither court questioned the decision to impose weight restric-
tions upon vehicles traveling on the highways because a rational basis
clearly could be perceived. The courts were not so willing, however, to
uphold the classification scheme with an assumption of rationality
where none seemed to exist. Rather, they inquired into the relation of
the classification to the general statutory purpose.3 7 The courts ad-
hered to the principle that, despite the fact that a legislature is pursuing
a presumptively valid state interest in enacting a regulation, the basis
for establishing any exempted class must be rationally related to the
object of the regulation in order to ensure equal protection of the laws.
Thus, although protection of the highways and promotion of a state
industry are both legitimate state interests, their achievement could not
properly be pursued within the same regulation, because the relation-
ship between highway regulation and economic development is simply
too remote.38
trary, unreasonable and without a substantial relation to the purpose of protecting the
highways, and thus violates... the Idaho Constitution, and the 14th Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution.
Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, 95 Idaho at 815-16, 661 P.2d at 862. In finding this statute unconstitu-
tional, the Idaho Supreme Court was ndt unaware of the more deferential approach undertaken in
cases such as Pyle that have upheld similar weight restriction statutes. The Idaho court distin-
guished the Pyle case as involving a classification that was in fact related to the statutory purpose.
It therefore did not read the Pyle approach as a blanket prohibition of the review and invalidation
of weight restriction statutes. See Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, 95 Idaho at 816, 661 P.2d at 862-63.
See also infra notes 39-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of Pyle.
35. Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, 95 Idaho at 816, 661 P.2d at 862. Following the Sterling H.
Nelson & Sons decision, the Idaho legislature amended the statute and abandoned the distinction
between carriers of processed and unprocessed agricultural products, while retaining a general
exemption for carriers of agricultural products. Act of Mar. 27, 1975, ch. 184, § 2, 1975 Idaho
Sess. Laws 502, 505. At the same time, the legislature reaffirmed the statutory distinctions in favor
of certain commercial or farm uses. Id § 1, at 502. The legislature expressly found that the econ-
omy of the state depended largely on forest, agricultural, livestock, mining, and related products
and that, because these products are "generally loaded at locations where weighing devices are not
available, . . fairness, justice and the public interest dictate that vehicles transporting the[se]
products. . be given a reasonable and adequate weight tolerance." Id at 502-03.
36. See, ag., id at 815, 520 P.2d at 862 ("a legislative act is presumed constitutional").
37. SeeAmyot, 119 N.H. at 673, 407 A.2d at 813 ("The State guarantees of equal protection
of the laws mandate 'that there be a rational relationship between the purpose of a statute and the
classifications which it makes.' ") (quoting State v. Hadley, 115 N.H. 541, 543, 345 A.2d 160, 161
(1975), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 802 (1976)); Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, 95 Idaho at 815, 520 P.2d
at 862 (classification must rest "upon some difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation").
38. See the approach taken by the Amyot court:
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B. Cases Upholding Exemptions Under the Rational Basis Test.
Other courts have approached and evaluated similar statutes in a
less demanding manner than did the New Hampshire and Idaho
Supreme Courts, although purportedly applying the same test. In the
case of State v. Pyle,39 the Oregon Supreme Court upheld a state statute
that exempted vehicles carrying logs, poles, or piling from meeting the
weight restriction imposed on other carriers and granted the favored
vehicles a higher weight limitation.40 Although the defendant would
have been in violation of either limitation, he was subject to a higher
fine because he carried a disfavored load.4'
The court adopted a line of analysis similar to Amyot and Sterling
H. Nelson & Sons, addressing the purpose of the statute, the classifica-
tion, and the relation between the two. The courts differed, however, in
applying the rational basis test. The Oregon court was more willing to
presume the existence of a rational basis for the classification. 42 It was
not troubled by the fact that the asserted justification of promoting eco-
nomic development is far removed from the immediate purposes of the
The State's argument that the special permit provision rationally relates to the legitimate
legislative purpose of promoting the lumber industry in the northern counties, and that
the classification it creates is therefore permissible, presumes the wrong analytical ap-
proach. Furthering the interest of lumbermen, although perhaps a proper subject for
economic legislation, has no relation to public safety or highway maintenance. The leg-
islature may not act to favor lumbermen by creating an arbitrary classification within a
public safety chapter.
119 N.H. at 673, 407 A.2d at 813-14. Similarly, the Sterling H. Nelson & Sons court stated:
A statute which [exempts] a hauler [of]. . . unprocessed grain. . . bears no relation to
the object of protecting the highways. In the absence of some showing that a safety
factor or other exigency requires such a distinction. . . such a distinction is arbitrary,
unreasonable and without a substantial relation to the purpose of protecting the high-
ways.
95 Idaho at 815-16, 520 P.2d at 862-63.
39. 226 Or. 485, 360 P.2d 626 (1961).
40. The Oregon statute established a maximum vehicle tandem axle weight of 32,000 pounds
for all vehicles except vehicles carrying logs, poles, and piling which were allowed a maximum
vehicle tandem axle weight of 34,000 pounds. See id at 487, 360 P.2d at 627.
41. The defendant's vehicle weighed 34,100 pounds. Had he been carrying logs, poles, or
piling the vehicle would have been 100 pounds overweight and he would have incurred a fine of
$25. Because he was not carrying an exempted commodity, the vehicle was 2,100 pounds over-
weight and he incurred a fine of $63. Id
42. Extremely deferential to the legislature, the court readily assumed that a rational reason
for establishing the classification existed:
Legislation usually is the product of the adjustment of various interests. The factors
considered by the legislature in making these adjustments do not ordinarily appear in the
statute which is the end product of the legislative process. It is patent that the principal
concern of the legislation.., was the preservation of the highways. It seems equally
obvious that the legislature found that the enactment of such legislation required an
adjustment of the interests of the haulers of logs, poles and piling. The reasons for se-
lecting this one class of commodities for special treatment are not explicitly stated in the
statutes. But that is no obstacle in sustaining the legislation if there is any rational basis
for such treatment.
Pyle, 226 Or. at 489-90, 360 P.2d at 628-29 (citations omitted).
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regulation-highway protection and public safety.4 3 Rather, it ex-
pressly recognized the right of the legislature to pursue two separate
but legitimate goals under the guise of one.44 Thus, a highway weight
regulation may serve both to protect the highways and to promote a
favored state industry.45 Despite these assertions, however, the court
also set forth in great detail the manner in which the classification was
related to the general statutory purpose of highway safety.46
A federal district court upheld a similar state statute in (uridge v.
Virginia.47 The statute at issue exempted four distinct classes from
meeting general weight restrictions, allowing the exempted classes to
operate within higher limits. 48 The carriers challenging the statute
were not eligible for the exemption under the language of the statute.
They were, however, capable of hauling the same bulk commodities
specified---concrete, coal and farm produce.49
The court applied the rational basis test in a fashion that seems to
43. "The special treatment afforded to haulers of logs, poles or piling could be justified here
if only on the ground that the legislature desired to foster the logging industry through the special
benefits afforded to those hauling the raw products of the forests." Id at 490, 360 P.2d at 629
(citing Anderson v. Thomas, 144 Or. 572, 615, 26 P.2d 60, 75 (1933) (Anderson upheld a transpor-
tation tax favoring carriers of logs, pilings, poles, and rough timber and recognized the importance
of the lumbering business to the state and the state interest in encouraging its development)).
44. [Tihe assumption that the only possible purpose which the legislature could have
had in mind in enacting the overload statutes was the preservation of the highways is a
purely gratuitous assumption. The mere fact that the principal purpose of the legislation
was to preserve the highway does not mean that the legislature may not also have had
other considerations in mind.
Pyle, 226 Or. at 489, 360 P.2d at 628.
45. Id
46. The court apparently was not completely at ease with its previous assertion that exemp-
tions from weight restrictions may be based upon grounds totally unrelated to the object of the
highway regulation itself. It proceeded to establish how the basis for the exemption could in fact
be rationally related to the object of the statute. The court referred to the state's arguments and
the legislative history of the weight restriction statute that set forth reasons for the special treat-
ment of haulers of forest products. Id at 491-92, 360 P.2d at 629. These included the facts that the
logs usually are loaded in the woods where it is impractical to provide scales and that it is difficult
to estimate accurately the weight and distribution of a load given the variations among logs, and,
most directly related to the statutory purpose, the possibility that hauling these commodities
presents less of a menace to the highways because they are hauled over unimproved roads for a
substantial part of their journey and are transported over the highways for a relatively short time
compared to most other goods. Id Thus, the Oregon Supreme Court actually seemed to conclude
that the 2,000 pound "leeway" was indeed rationally related to the highway safety and mainte-
nance goals and was therefore not "unreasonable or arbitrary." Id at 492, 360 P.2d at 629-30.
47. 532 F. Supp. 533 (E.D. Va. 1982).
48. The exempted classes include vehicles carrying containerized cargo in sealed, seagoing
containers, bound to or from a Virginia seaport, three-axle vehicles used exclusively for transport-
ing necessary components to produce concrete immediately upon arrival at a project site, special
vehicles used in hauling coal to a preparation plant, loading dock, or railroad, and trucks hauling
farm produce on the Eastern Shore. See VA. CODE §§ 46.1-343(a)(2),(b)(l),(c), 343.1 (Supp. 1984).
49. Gutridge, 532 F. Supp. at 536.
Vol. 1984:963] HIGHWAY WEIGHT.RESTRICTIONS
place Guiridge on a scale of scrutiny between Amyot and Pyle.50 The
court did not go as far as Pyle in asserting that there need be no relation
between the exemption and the purpose of the regulation, but was will-
ing to presume a legitimate state interest and rational basis for each
classification. The court strained to relate the "rational basis" for each
exemption to the general area of transportation.5 1 The effective stan-
dard of review applied by the court appears to have been largely per-
functory. It is unlikely that a statute would be invalidated pursuant to
such an undemanding standard.5 2
50. Id at 537. According to the court, the rational basis test "requires only that the State's
system be shown to bear some rational relationship to legitimate state purposes." Id at 536. The
court did not specifically address whether a regulation and its exemptions could "rationally" pur-
sue two distinct legitimate state purposes, as did the court in Pyle, see supra notes 43-46 and
accompanying text, or, conversely, whether a regulation and its exemptions must be based upon
the same legitimate state purpose to be rational, as in Amyot, see supra notes 23-28 and accompa-
nying text, and Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, see supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
51. The court's treatment of the first exemption, involving containerized cargo, is perplexing.
The court identified several possible legitimate state objectives and then summarily presumed the
existence of a rational basis as follows:
Encouraging the growth of a particular form of transportation is a legitimate legislative
purpose. . . . Containerized cargo is an integral part of international trade. Facilitating
its transportation to and from Virginia's ports aids in the development of such ports.
Thus, the containerized cargo exception stands up under a rational-basis examination.
Gutrldge, 532 F. Supp. at 537. As to the concrete-mixer exemption, the court noted that these
specialized vehicles weigh more than others. Id The exemption limited the distance and speed of
their travel to low levels, so the court found that a rational basis existed for relaxing the weight
restrictions. Id As to the coal hauling exemption, the court identified two legitimate state objec-
tives that rendered it rational: promoting the efficient transportation of coal and aiding the en-
forcement of weight limits, presumably because the exemption required that any qualifying
vehicle must be designed to permit a visual determination of whether it was carrying more than
the permitted amount of coal. VA. CODE § 46.1-343(c) (Supp. 1984); see Gutrldge, 532 F. Supp. at
535-36. The fourth exemption, for farm products hauled on the Eastern Shore, was handled much
like the first one. The court identified several possible state objectives, including the promotion of
a state industry. That objective was somehow integrated among other transportation-oriented
objectives, resulting in a determination of rationality:
The seasonal nature of farming limits the use of this exception to the warmer months of
the year when the potential for road damage is least. In addition, the peculiar geography
of the Eastern Shore creates transportation impediments that place farmers in that area
at a disadvantage in marketing their produce. A shortage of vehicles in the region com-
pounds the problem. The relaxation of weight limits reduces the number of trucks
needed to haul the produce. [The exemption], therefore, furthers the legitimate legisla-
tive goal of remedying the Eastern Shore's transportation difficulties.
Id at 537.
52. The court evidenced a concern that requiring a strong correlation between the exemption
and the purpose of the regulatory scheme would revive the notion of economic due process. "If
the court had overturned one of the exceptions in the absence of a suspect classification or a
fundamental right, it, in effect, would have revived the notion of economic due process. The
Supreme Court discarded that form of due process long ago." Gutrldge, 532 F. Supp. at 537
(citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1954); see also Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423-25 (1952)); supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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IV. EVALUATION OF THE HIGHWAY WEIGHT RESTRICTION CASES
As demonstrated by the preceding cases, courts have varied as to
the appropriate scope of judicial review pursuant to the rational basis
test and, correspondingly, the proper measure of deference owed to a
legislature in the areas of police power and economic regulation. The
inquiry here is whether one approach is clearly superior. Ostensibly
involved in state regulation of highways is the state's police power to
legislate for public health and safety and protection of roads, and its
power to regulate economic activity. The legislature is given wide dis-
cretion in each of these areas.53 Whether an exemption can be success-
fully challenged depends upon the extent to which the court will search
for a legitimate legislative purpose rationally related to the statute, and
whether the court will require that an exemption correspond to the
overall purpose of the statutory scheme.
Central to the validity of both Amyot and Sterling H Nelson &
Sons is the United States Supreme Court case of Smith v. Cahoon.5 4 At
issue in Cahoon was an exemption from a state statute that required
carriers to obtain certificates of public convenience and necessity. To
obtain such a certificate, those not exempt were required to post bond
or to obtain insurance for the protection of passengers, other members
of the public, and freight.55 In apparent disregard of this stated pur-
pose, the legislature based availability of an exemption upon the type
of commodity carried. Vehicles exclusively engaged in transporting ag-
ricultural products, dairy products, and seafood were relieved from the
obligation of providing indemnification to the public. 56
The Court acknowledged the right of a state to issue such a regula-
tion and noted that the exemptions alone did not render it repugnant to
the equal protection clause.5 7 The Court stressed, however, that despite
the broad discretion permitted a state in the formulation of classifica-
tions for the purpose of regulation, the power was not without limita-
tion. The equal protection clause provides a constraint against entirely
arbitrary distinctions.5 8
53. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 523 (1959); United States v.
Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
54. 283 U.S. 553 (1931).
55. Id at 558-59.
56. The relevant portion of the Florida statute exempted those "engaged exclusively in the
transporting [of] agricultural, horticultural, dairy or other farm products and fresh and Salt Fish
and Oysters and Shrimp from the point of production to the assembling or shipping point enroute
to primary market or to motor vehicles used exclusively in transporting or delivering dairy prod-
ucts." Id at 557.
57. Id at 556.
58. Id at 566-67.
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In order to determine whether the classifications were in fact arbi-
trary as alleged, the Court looked to the general purpose of the regula-
tion and identified it as one of promoting public safety and welfare. 59
The indemnification regulation was rationally related to this legitimate
legislative objective. 60 The Court, however, could find no rational rela-
tion between the legitimate legislative objective and the exemptions
created by the statute.61 The Court determined that distinctions based
upon the type of commodity carried were totally unrelated to the pur-
pose of public safety and welfare, and invalidated the exemption as
denying equal protection to those not exempt. 62 Clearly, under Ca-
hoon, the fact that a classification rationally relates to any legitimate
state objective is insufficient for equal protection purposes. The classi-
fication must be rationally related to the objective pursued by the legis-
lative enactment.
Cahoon would provide unassailable support for the approach
taken in Amyot and Sterling H. Nelson & Sons were it not for the fact
that it was decided in 1931, when the Supreme Court was reaching the
end of the Lochner eta.63 It may thus be argued that Cahoon should be
disregarded as the product of an illegitimate era. There is also support,
however, for the contrary proposition that judicial review of the rela-
tionship of a classification to the alleged purpose of a statutory scheme
does not necessarily involve an inquiry into the substantive wisdom of
a legislative decision and is not prohibited by post-Lochner era cases.
59. The purpose of the bond was to afford security for the public against injuries and to
protect the persons and property transported. Id at 565.
60. Id
61. The analogy between the statutory classifications in Cahoon and the highway weight re-
striction exemptions is obvious. Just as there is no rational basis, grounded in a concern for public
safety, for exempting carriers of shrimp, milk, or corn from furnishing the insurance that all other
carriers are required to furnish, there is also no rational basis, grounded in a concern for public
safety or highway maintenance, for exempting carriers of poultry, milk, or corn from meeting the
highway weight restrictions that all other carriers must meet.
62. The Court stated:
In determining what is within the range of discretion and what is arbitrary, regard must
be had to the particular subject of the State's action. In the present instance, the regula-
tion as to the giving of a bond or insurance policy to protect the public generally, in
order to be sustained, must be deemed to relate to the public safety. [There is] no doubt
of the power of the State to insist upon suitable protection for the public against injuries
through the operations on its highways of carriers for hire .... But, in establishing such
a regulation, there does not appear to be the slightest justification for making a distinc-
tion between those who carry for hire farm products, or milk or butter, or fish or oysters,
and those who carry for hire bread or sugar, or tea or coffee, or groceries in general, or
other useful commodities. So far as the statute was designed to safeguard the public with
respect to the use of the highways, ... the discrimination it makes.., was wholly
arbitrary and constituted a violation of the appellant's constitutional right. "Such a clas-
sification is not based on anything having relation to the purpose for which it is made."
Cahoon, 283 U.S. at 567 (quoting Air-Way Elec. Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 85 (1924)).
63. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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The deference that modem courts afford legislatures when they
exercise the police power to protect the public welfare or enact an eco-
nomic regulation reflects an unwillingness to return to the highly in-
terventionist Lochner era of substantive equal protection-a period
during which courts employed the fourteenth amendment to strike
down laws perceived to be based upon imprudent legislative judg-
ment.64 Under the rational basis standard of review developed in reac-
tion to the Lochner era, courts are in effect prohibited from intruding
upon legislative value judgments and substituting their own social and
economic beliefs for the discretion of those elected to legislate. 65 Dis-
tinctions and discriminations imposed by state laws do not violate the
equal protection clause so long as they are not irrational, arbitrary, or
invidious.66
Some courts have taken this to mean that judicial inquiry into any
aspect of a police power or economic regulation necessarily entails a
return to the forbidden Lochner era.67 A fear of violating this under-
standing of the post-Lochner era was apparent in the manner in which
the Pyle and Gutridge courts summarily conceded the existence of a
rational basis for the exemptions being challenged.68 Despite this sum-
mary conclusion, both courts addressed the relationship between the
purpose of the statute and the classifications that it made and inquired
whether it was rational. The Gutridge court attempted to tie each statu-
tory exemption to a transportation theme,69 and the Pyle court discov-
ered possible highway maintenance rationales that could support the
statute.70 Even those courts most reluctant to engage in a Lochner-type
review implicitly acknowledge the significance to the doctrine of equal
protection of the relationship between the purpose of a statute and the
classifications that it makes.
Significantly, Cahoon, unlike other products of the Lochner era,
64. See supra note 12.
65. See, e.g., Olsen v. Nebraska ex rel Western Reference & Bond Ass'n, 313 U.S. 236, 246
(1941) ("We are not concerned ... with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the
legislation.").
66. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 673-74 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting)
("The equal protection cases carefully analyzed boil down to the principle that distinctions drawn
and even discriminations imposed by state laws do not violate the Equal Protection Clause so long
as these distinctions and discriminations are not irrational, irrelevant, unreasonable, arbitrary, or
invidious.").
67. See, e.g., Gutridge 532 F. Supp. at 537.
68. See supra notes 42, 51 and accompanying text.
69. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
70. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
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has never been expressly overruled.71 Indeed, it has been cited by the
Supreme Court in subsequent decisions without any suggestion of its
invalidity.72 For example, Cahoon was distinguished and endorsed by
the Court in Sproles v. Binford,73 which the Court repeatedly has up-
71. Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923) was expressly overruled in West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937). Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915), were rejected in Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwest-
ern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 535-36 (1949). Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590 (1917) was
also recognized as undermined in Lincoln Federal Labor Union, 335 U.S. at 535. Adams had held
a state statute prohibiting a "useful" business to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment. 244
U.S. at 596-97.
72. See, e.g., Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 513 (1977) (Brennan, J., concur-
ring); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 145 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 551 (1971)
(Brennan, J., dissenting); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 674 n.2 (1966) (Black,
J., dissenting); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 394 (1932).
Interestingly, of the post-Lochner era cases in which the Court has cited Cahoon, only one has
entailed the invalidation of a state economic regulation on equal protection grounds. See Morey
v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 458 (1957) (striking down a provision of the Illinois Community Currency
Exchanges Act that exempted money orders of the American Express Company from the statute's
requirement that firms selling or issuing money orders in that state must secure a license and
submit to state regulation). The Court relied on both Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483
(1954) and Cahoon without noting any apparent inconsistency in their approaches. 354 U.S. at
465. The Court noted the wide scope of discretion granted the state in the enactment of and
classifications within police laws, the propriety of judicial invalidation only where a statute "is
without any reasonable basis and therefore is purely arbitrary," and the principle that any state of
facts must be assumed that reasonably can be conceived to sustain a classification. Doud, 354 U.S.
at 463-64. It was further noted that the "'prohibition of the Equal Protection Clause goes no
further than the invidious discrimination.'" Id at 463 (quoting Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. at 489).
Subsequently, the Court cited Cahoon for its assertion that "a statutory discrimination must be
reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found." Id at 465.
Doud has since been overruled in City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976).
The Court failed, however, to suggest the invalidity of Cahoon or to dismiss explicitly the need for
some rational relation between a statutory classification and the object of that statute. The Court
reiterated the principle that "in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination,
the wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at
303-04. The Court failed to state whether a classification must be rationally related to the same
legitimate state interest with which the statute deals. See id at 303. The holding of the case,
however, may provide some guidance. New Orleans had enacted a prohibition against selling
foodstuffs from pushcarts in the French Quarter, but had exempted vendors with eight years or
more seniority. The Court sought to demonstrate that the exemption was rationally related to the
statutory objective of "preserv[ing] the appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents
and attractive to tourists." Id at 304. The exempted vendors "had themselves become part of the
distinctive character and charm that distinguishes the [French Quarter]." Id The Court found
additional support for the exemption in the possibility that the legislature had decided to proceed
on a gradual basis, rationally eliminating the more recent vendors initially. Id This principle of
gradual implementation was first enunciated in Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. at 489 ("[Rleform may
take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the
legislative mind.').
73. 286 U.S. 374, 394 (1932). At issue in Sproles was a state statute exempting farm vehicles
and vehicles making hauls of less than eight miles from meeting highway weight restrictions. Id
at 391-92. The Court upheld the statute on the ground that the use of the highways by such
vehicles was relatively brief and confined to small areas. Id at 392. Even if the classification was
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held and cited in support of anti-Lochner positions. 74 Additionally,
Professor John Hart Ely, a leading commentator in the field, has ar-
gued that Cahoon "is not simply a derelict surviving from the 'overac-
tive' early 1930's."'75 Rather, it is a legitimate equal protection case in
which the Court has applied a "sort of 'consensus' theory, asking not
what motivation underlay the specific distinction in question, but
rather what such laws are generally concerned with, what most legisla-
tors intend to accomplish by most such laws considered in their en-
tirety."' 76 Thus a court may follow the approach of Cahoon, as in
Amyot and Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, without risking a retreat to
Lochner.
In his examination of judicial equal protection analysis, Ely
pointed to the process of goal definition 77 by which permissible and
impermissible goals are distinguished, and rejected the notion that once
a goal is deemed permissible in one context, its pursuit is per se permis-
sible in all contexts. 78 Accordingly, under Ely's theory, a classification
also intended to encourage transportation by railroad instead of by truck, the Court added, its
constitutionality was still ensured given the rational relation between reducing the flow of traffic
and maintaining the condition of the roads. Id at 394. Thus, the Court noted:
This is not a case of a denial of the use of the highways to one class of citizens as opposed
to another, or of limitations having no appropriate relation to highway protection. It is
not a case of an arbitrary discrimination between the products carried, as in the case of
Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567.
Sproles, 286 U.S. at 394.
74. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963), a case very critical of the Lochner era.
Ferguson quoted Sproles, 286 U.S. at 388, for the proposition that the Court does not sit to "sub-
ject the State to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our Government and
wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was in-
tended to secure." Ferguson, 372 U.S. at 730.
75. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205,
1225-26 (1970). Ely attempts to reconcile the various approaches that the Supreme Court has
undertaken in equal protection analysis. He is critical of the Court's inconsistency regarding the
relevance of legislative "motive" or "purpose" to the constitutionality of a statute, id at 1207-12,
and attempted to formulate a useful model for guidance as to the circumstances under which
motivation is relevant. Id at 1281-84.
76. Id at 1226.
77. Id at 1224-25. As presented by Ely, a basic issue addressed by equal protection analysis
is the burden that the government owes with respect to distinctions that invariably treat some
persons better than others. Meeting this burden initially requires the government to "point to
some difference which distinguishes the persons or items on one side of the line its action has
drawn [from] those on the other." Id at 1223. Recognized in the process of determining whether
this distinction constitutes a "legitimately defensible difference" is the fact that the government
will have a different type of burden to bear depending upon the nature of the classification or the
substantiality of the benefit or deprivation at stake. Id at 1223-24. Where a choice is properly
related to a legitimate goal, it will constitute a "legitimate defense" in an equal protection evalua-
tion. Id at 1224.
78. Id at 1224-25. Ely asserts that government officials should not be privileged to pursue a
goal in any context merely because that goal may legitimately be pursued in another context. He
demonstrates this by suggesting a clearly unacceptable scenario which could otherwise arise: Be-
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may be examined to determine whether it rationally relates to the pur-
pose of the statute, without challenging the wisdom of the legislature's
action or necessarily engaging in the type of inquiry into legislative
motivation and judgment reminiscent of the Lochner era.79
Ely's position as to the validity of Cahoon and his theory regarding
the permissible scope of judicial review under the modem rational ba-
sis test go far toward endorsing the approach taken in Amyot and Ster-
ling H. Nelson & Sons. This approach has not been confined to the area
of highway weight regulation, but has extended to other exercises of the
police power resulting in economic discrimination. In Goodman v.
Kennedy,80 for example, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered
the constitutionality of two statutory provisions that exempted certain
types of stores from a criminal provision forbidding the sale of fresh
meats, produce, and groceries on Sunday. 8' Although referring to the
wide degree of latitude accorded the legislature in making such classifi-
cations,82 the court noted the requirement that legislative classifica-
tions be reasonably related to legitimate statutory objectives. 83 After
identifying the valid statutory purpose of providing a day of rest and
recreation for members of the public, the court sustained an exemption
for businesses employing less than ten persons as rationally related to
that goal.84 The court refused, however, to uphold a provision that ex-
cause farming can constitutionally be encouraged with subsidies, a statute could be enacted that
would attempt to encourage farming by limiting driver's licenses to farmers or free public educa-
tion to their children. Id at 1224. Ely also argues that "numerous decisions of the Court make
clear that it is not prepared to recognize as acceptable in all contexts all goals it is prepared to
recognize as acceptable in some." Id at 1224-25. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964)
(holding that farming can be made more attractive by subsidies and tax breaks, but not by weigh-
ing farmers' votes more heavily), cited in, Ely, supra note 75, at 1227.
79. Thus, where a law obviously has to do with traffic safety, a court may hold, regardless of
the underlying motive, that the specific classification at issue must be justifiable in terms of safety.
Likewise, a subsidy program or a tax program may be an appropriate vehicle for legislative pro-
motion of an activity which advances the general welfare or safety, but a motor vehicle code is
not. Ely, supra note 75, at 1226.
80. 459 Pa. 313, 329 A.2d 224 (1974).
81. Id at 318-19, 329 A.2d at 227.
82. The legislature has the constitutional authority to establish different classifications of
persons and to provide for different treatment of the classifications under the law so long
as the basis for each is reasonably related to the evils sought to be prevented .... The
constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to
have acted within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws
result in some inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of
facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Id at 321, 329 A.2d at 228 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961)).
83. Id at 325, 329 A.2d at 230.
84. Id The court concluded that public enjoyment of a day of rest and recreation could be
enhanced by the employment of some and the recreation of others and that the number selected
was a reasonable distinction. By stating that a mathematical limit as a basis for classification is
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empted businesses operated by the proprietor or members of his family
on the ground that a distinction based solely upon family status is not
rationally related to the primary statutory objective and is therefore
unconstitutionally discriminatory.8 5
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from the divergent cases
is that there exist viable arguments in support of both approaches to the
constitutionality of highway weight restrictions. These approaches re-
flect the differing views of the courts as to the proper degree of defer-
ence to be accorded highway weight restrictions. Pyle and Gutridge
regard the modem rational basis test as endorsing legislative pursuit of
any legitimate goal in any realm,86 while Amyot and Sterling H. Nelson
& Sons interpret the test to be more confining, prohibiting the pursuit
of a goal in one regulatory context although permitting it in another.8 7
The resolve of the Pyle and Cutridge courts to avoid judicial re-
view reminiscent of the Lochner era is understandable given the mod-
em Court's complete disavowal of that period.8 8 The fact that the
statutes at issue were enacted pursuant to the police power and resulted
in discrimination of an economic nature reinforces this approach. As
noted previously, courts exhibit a great amount of deference when stat-
utes are enacted pursuant to the police power8 9 and employ the least
rigorous standard of review when the alleged discrimination is eco-
nomic in nature.90
It may be, however, that the courts in Pyle and Cutridge were ex-
treme in their efforts to avoid "Lochnerizing." An examination of the
relationship between the object of a highway weight restriction statute
constitutional if the number bears a rational relation to a legitimate legislative objective, the court
implied that a distinction drawn at 10,000 would have been deemed irrational and unconstitu-
tional. Id at 322, 329 A.2d at 229.
85. Id at 326-27, 329 A.2d at 231. Because the exemption gave an economic advantage to
certain groups solely because of the degree of consanguinity, other groups similarly situated ex-
cept for this factor were placed at an economic disadvantage. The factor at issue was unrelated to
the overall statutory purpose. The court cited Cahoon, 283 U.S. at 566-67, to conclude:
Economic discrimination, in and of itself, is not a legitimate legislative objective which
justifies the closing of some stores on Sunday and not others. Economic discrimination
can be tolerated constitutionally only when it is incidental to some other legitimate legis-
lative objective. A classification based on family status might be reasonably related to a
legitimate legislative objective in other contexts, even though economic discrimination
incidentally results, but we are unable to perceive any reasonable relationship in the
present context. Without such relationship, the family status classification violates the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
Goodman, 459 Pa. at 326-27, 329 A.2d at 231.
86. See supra notes 42-45 & 50-52 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 23-28 & 32-38 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 12-13 & 16.
89. See supra notes 4, 13 and accompanying text.
90. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
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and the classifications that it makes does not necessarily entail an in-
quiry into the substantive wisdom of a legislative decision. Indeed, the
courts in Amyot and Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, in contrast to the Loch-
ner Court, did not debate whether the legislatures had made reasoned
decisions based upon accurate facts.9' The courts identified two legis-
lative objectives at work, both legitimate, and relied upon the Cahoon
precedent to determine that the pursuit of one objective under the guise
of the other is impermissible inasmuch as it entailed a wholly arbitrary
classification. 92
Basic notions of fairness upon which the equal protection clause
rests justify the approach of the Amyot and Sterling H Nelson & Sons
courts. Many of the weight restriction exemptions exist for the purpose
of favoring a particular industry.93 Although such special treatment is
ostensibly a function of concern for the state economy, often it is in-
stead a function of persuasive campaign contributions and the dispro-
portionate influence of lobbying interests. Although such pressures
and incentives are inherent in the political system, fairness and equal
protection are best served when a lawmaker cannot conceal a special
favor under the guise of a more readily acceptable legislative objective.
If the legislature chooses to treat a certain industry with favor, Amyot
and Sterling H. Nelson & Sons force it to do so in a straightforward
manner-by granting favorable tax treatment or instituting a subsidy
program.94 Because the discriminatory classifications made by high-
way weight restriction statutes are wholly unrelated to the evils such
statutes generally seek to prevent, the classifications appear susceptible
to challenge on equal protection grounds.
V. CONCLUSION
From the standpoint of basic fairness, decisions invalidating dis-
criminatory highway weight restriction exemptions on equal protection
grounds seem correct. Whether their interpretation and application of
the modem rational basis test is in accord with the present intent of the
United States Supreme Court is less clear. The Court certainly has re-
stricted the extent of judicial scrutiny permitted in this area. The level
of scrutiny once undertaken in economic classifications is now reserved
for situations in which a fundamental right or suspect class is affected.
Nevertheless, the Court has not expressly overruled Cahoon or its
91. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905) ("We do not believe in the soundness of the
views which uphold this law.").
92. See supra notes 23-28, 34 & 37-38 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 38, 42, 51 & 62 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 78-79.
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premise that a classification must bear a rational relation to the purpose
of the statute. The Court's continued prohibition of irrational, irrele-
vant, or unreasonable classifications imposed by state law would seem
to permit the Amyot and Sterling H. Nelson & Sons approach. This
approach allows for the invalidation of those weight restriction exemp-
tions that are in no way related to public safety and highway mainte-
nance.
Lorrie M. Marcil
